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Abstract 
When valuing health states, health economists often ask respondents how many years of 
life in poor health they would be willing to trade off in order to live in full health. There 
are many problems inherent in eliciting preferences of this kind that have led us to 
advocate more direct measures of experienced utility. Yet individuals are often willing to 
make large sacrifices in life expectancy to alleviate conditions for which there is a 
considerable degree of hedonic adaptation. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
this important discrepancy in more detail. Data from 1173 internet and telephone surveys 
in the United States suggest that frequent and negative thoughts about health are 
significant in explaining time trade-off responses. We discuss some of the implications of 
these results for the measurement and valuation of health. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Decisions about who gets what treatment should be informed by the value of the 
benefits that health services generate. The question is how to judge the value of those 
benefits. Up until about 100 years ago, economists would have thought about benefits in 
terms of people’s experiences – the greater the gains in an individual’s enjoyment of an 
outcome, the greater the benefit (Edgeworth, 1881). More recently, they have thought 
about benefits in terms of preferences – the stronger an individual’s preference for that 
outcome, the greater the benefit (Fisher, 1918). The two definitions amount to the same 
thing if people want most what they will eventually enjoy best, and this is a common, yet 
descriptively flawed, assumption in discussions of utility in economics. 
 
Methods have been developed for valuing states of health that are based on preferences 
and which allow for the calculation of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). The QALY 
approach assigns a weight between 0 (for death) and 1 (for full health) to each state of 
health and then multiplies that value by how long the state lasts. QALYs are increasingly 
being used by health technology assessment agencies to help determine the relative cost-
effectiveness of different interventions e.g. they are used by the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK. There are three main questions that 
need to be addressed to calculate the “quality adjustment” part of the QALY: what is to 
be valued; how is it to be valued; and who is to value it (Dolan, 2000)?  
 
The choice of what refers to the dimensions of health or well-being being considered. 
Most health economists would recommend using an established generic measure of 
health that is designed specifically for generating QALYs. One such descriptive system is 
the EQ-5D, which describes health in terms of three levels (broadly, no problems, some 
problems and extreme problems) for each of five dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual 
activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression). The choice of how refers to the ways 
in which the health states are valued so that they lie on a 0-1 scale. One of the most 
widely used preference-based methods is the time trade-off (TTO), which requires 
respondents to consider how many years in full health are equivalent to a longer period 
of time in a poor health state. The choice of who refers to the source of health state 
values, such as ‘patients’ experiencing a particular state or the ‘public’ asked to imagine it.  
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 A set of valuations for the EQ-5D have been estimated from the responses to 
hypothetical TTO questions of a representative sample of over 3000 members of the UK 
general population (Dolan, 1997). NICE recommends that patients describe their own 
health using the EQ-5D and that the population valuation set be used to determine the 
number of QALYs associated with any change in health state as a result of intervention. 
These recommendations are also being followed in other countries (e.g. Australia and 
Canada), and are broadly consistent with the current emphasis in economics on an 
account of well-being that is based on the satisfaction of preferences. 
 
We are very sceptical about the suitability of preference-based methods in calculating 
health state values (see, for example, Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). There are good 
reasons and evidence to suggest that strength of preference is often a poor guide to the 
subsequent intensity of experience (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998; Gilbert and Wilson, 
2003). The general public tend to overestimate the severity of the loss from many (but 
not all) health conditions, partly because they exaggerate the extent to which patients 
attend to their health state Imagine being asked to value walking with a cane. It is almost 
impossible to avoid imagining that as you walk you will be thinking about the cane much 
of the time when, in fact, the cane will rarely be the focus of your attention, especially as 
time passes. 
 
Focussing effects are an issue for any preference elicitation question for any population, 
including ‘patients’, since what we focus on in the question may not be focussed on the 
same extent in the experience of our lives. In addition, the TTO requires patients to 
consider how their future experiences would be different were they to be in full health. 
Whilst many patients would have had previous experience of full health, their evaluative 
recollection of this will be far from perfect and they will also focus disproportionately on 
ways in which their lives will be different from now (Wilson et al, 2003). A person who 
walks with a cane who is asked to imagine having their walking restrictions alleviated will 
inevitably imagine actively enjoying the freedom of normal walking, which they will 
quickly take for granted. 
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To more accurately reflect the effect of different health states on people’s well-being, 
policy-makers in health and elsewhere should pay more attention to experienced utility, 
as approximated by the flow of feelings over time. The day reconstruction method 
(DRM) has been specifically designed to measure experienced utility in this way 
(Kahneman et al, 2004). The DRM asks respondents to divide the previous day into a 
number of episodes and then to rate different feelings during those activities. The ratings 
of different feelings in the DRM can be aggregated in different ways (Kahneman and 
Krueger, 2006) but any summary measure of feelings will have cardinal properties so long 
as each unit of time is treated equally (which is a key assumption of the QALY model, of 
course). There are questions about whether and how measures of experienced utility 
should be expressed on a standard 0 to 1 (dead to full health) QALY scale but we do not 
discuss these further here. 
 
This paper focuses on the apparently compelling evidence showing that people are often 
willing to make large sacrifices in life expectancy to alleviate conditions for which there is 
a considerable degree of hedonic adaptation. For example, Smith et al (2006) elicited 
median TTO values for the reversal of colostomy from colostomy patients of 0.85 (on 
the standard 0-1 scale) despite those patients apparently experiencing levels of affect 
similar to people without colostomies. Such results certainly lend further support to the 
focussing illusion, whereby nothing in life (including a colostomy) is quite as important as 
you think it is while you are thinking about it. 
 
However, we should also consider the possibility that methods such as the DRM do not 
provide a fully adequate description of the effects of states of health and illness on 
experienced utility itself. Respondents in the DRM divide the day into episodes and then 
list the activities they are engaged in each episode and the people they were with, before 
rating the various feelings that characterised the episode. By focussing attention on 
activities, the DRM may bias the response towards the feelings that are normal for these 
activities and so the experiential effects of other thoughts and concerns may be 
underweighted in this procedure. Similar questions can be raised about the experience 
sampling method, which asks for assessments of current feelings and in which activities 
are commonly elicited before those feelings (Stone et al, 1999).  
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In fact, there is now good evidence that our attention drifts between current activities 
and concerns about other things (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Such “mind-
wandering” is frequent e.g. about 20% of the time spent reading is spent thinking about 
other things (Schooler et al, 2005) and this rises to 50% for more mundane activities 
(Smallwood et al, 2004). Generally speaking, positive (negative) thoughts result in higher 
(lower) experienced utility (Watkins, 2008) and returning to the same repetitive thoughts, 
such that they become intrusive, is associated with lower experienced utility (Klinger and 
Cox, 1987). At the extreme, constant rumination has seriously debilitating effects on 
mental health (Brewin, 1998).  
 
So, whilst the mood of colostomy patients and non-patients may be similar when they 
are thinking about the activities in their lives – or indeed when thinking about their mood 
over the course of a day more generally – colostomy patients may sometimes have lower 
experienced utility as a result of more frequent, negative thoughts about their health. 
Intrusive thoughts may then go part way towards explaining why some patients are 
willing to trade off life years to improve their health state. We conducted an on-line and 
telephone study of 1173 members of the US general population that focused on testing 
the degree to which TTO responses can be explained by thoughts about health in 
addition to the EQ-5D and assessments of mood. Only the mental health dimension of 
the EQ-5D is significant across different models. TTO responses are unrelated to overall 
feelings yesterday but frequent, negative thoughts about health are associated with lower 
TTO values.  
 
In the next two sections, we describe our study in more detail. In the final section, we 
discuss our results, particularly in the context of focussing effects, and suggest some 
directions for future research. ‘What is to be valued’ should be the impact that health 
states have on thoughts and feelings over time in the standard QALY ‘duration-weighted’ 
sense but the answer to the question of ‘how is it to be valued’ is complicated by the fact 
that experienced utility is derived from a number of sources, such as the activities we 
engage in and the thoughts we have. Future research efforts should seek to understand 
more about the effect of what we attend to and how our attention is related to the health 
states we experience. Since we are committed to more routine assessment of experienced 
utility, ‘who is to value it’ should be anyone affected by an intervention.  
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 2. Methods  
 
2.1 Questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire consisted of three main sections followed by standard questions on 
background characteristics (e.g. sex, age, marital status and income). In the first section, 
there were two questions relating to yesterday: “Overall, how satisfied were you with your day 
yesterday [on a 0-6 scale]?” and “Overall, how did you feel yesterday? Please rate each feeling on the 
scale given. A 0 means that you did not experience that feeling at all and a 6 means that you experienced 
that feeling very strongly” The adjectives were friendly, lethargic, stressed, happy, sad, 
interested, useful, calm, angry, tired, inspired, depressed, in control, worried, and focused. 
It turns out that asking respondents to rate the overall levels of feelings yesterday 
correlates pretty well with asking them to complete the more intensive DRM, and so we 
use these responses as proxies for DRM-type data. Second, there were questions about 
the frequency and intensity of thoughts yesterday about work, family, finances and 
health. Respondents were asked how often they had thought about each domain (not at 
all, a few times, many times, or continually). All reporting a few times or more were 
asked about the intensity of happy, angry, depressed and worried feelings on the same 0-
6 scale as used for overall feelings yesterday. These questions represented our attempt to 
pick up the degree to which thoughts affect respondents on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Third, respondents were asked to describe their health using the EQ-5D and to value 
their health using the TTO with a ten year time frame (as per Dolan, 1997): “Please indicate 
whether you would choose 10 years with your current health problems or fewer years, as specified below, 
without any health problems.” There were two variants of the TTO: one where the number of 
years without any health problems started at 10 and decreased (‘top down’) and one 
where the number of years without problems started at 0 and increased (‘bottom up’) to 
test for anchoring effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). There were also two versions of 
the main survey itself: one where section three (the EQ-5D and TTO) came last and one 
where it came first. This allows us to elicit the EQ-5D and the TTO in the standard 
(‘uncontaminated’) way and to test whether those responses are influenced by the 
feelings and thoughts questions. 
 6
 2.2 Sample 
 
The questionnaire was administered via on-line and telephone interviews with 
respondents who are part of a panel of members of the general public that are used by 
Rand in various health surveys. There are, of course, many issues about selection bias in 
relation to internet and telephone samples but this study was not designed to elicit 
responses from a truly representative sample of the population but, rather, to advance 
our understanding of the discrepancies between preference-based and experience-based 
measures of utility and of the various components of experienced utility. We include all 
1173 respondents in our analyses as we had no a priori reasons to exclude anyone.  
 
2.3 Analysis 
 
We begin by presenting some basic descriptive statistics about the respondents and about 
their responses to the main questions of interest in the study. For the TTO responses, 
which are in 6 month intervals, we take the mid-point to represent the point of 
indifference. So, if a respondent is willing to trade-off something but then says 10 years 
of their current health condition is preferred to 9.5 years in full health, then their TTO 
value would be taken to be 0.975. Using the mid-point as the value is standard practice in 
the health state valuation literature (Brazier et al, 2002).  
 
We then use standard regression analysis to explain TTO responses in terms of the EQ-
5D, the various measures of well-being, and a range of background variables. We present 
the results from only the most parsimonious models but describe here all the variables 
used in the analysis (and the results of all regression results are of course available from 
the authors upon request). Following Dolan (1997), eleven dummy variables are created 
for the EQ-5D i.e. one for each of the two possible moves away from level 1 for each of 
the five dimensions plus one dummy to pick up whether any dimension is at level 3. 
Because of the ‘core’ nature of these health variables, we include them all in every model 
irrespective of their significance levels. 
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We enter affect yesterday in a number of ways e.g. the highest and the average of all 
negative adjectives, the highest and the average of all positive adjectives, and the 
difference between the averages of positive and negative affect (these measures share 
similarities with the measures reported in Kahneman et al, 2004). For each domain of life 
that we ask about thoughts, the reference case is ‘no thoughts at all’. If respondents 
thought about health etc. a few times they were placed in the low frequency group and if 
they thought about health etc. many times or continually they were placed in the high 
frequency group. For each group, we use the ‘U-index method’ reported in Kahneman 
(2004) to determine positive or negative thoughts: namely if ‘happy’ was the highest or 
joint-highest rated feeling, the dummy takes a value of 0 (and the thoughts are labelled as 
‘positive’) and if the highest rated feeling was ‘angry’, ‘depressed’ or ‘worried’, it takes a 
value of 1. We adopt a ‘stepwise’ approach to the analysis by adding additional variables 
and check the size and significance of the coefficients on existing variables do not vary as 
we do so. We use a 5% level of significance on a two-tailed test throughout. 
 
We appreciate that these are cross-sectional data and, consistent with most other studies 
in this area, we cannot control for individual heterogeneity. Whilst instrumental variables 
analysis might be suitable for some data (e.g. when attempting to control for the 
endogeneity of income in happiness equations; see Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008), it 
raises further problems of its own and is not appropriate for these data. We also 
appreciate that, again like most health state valuation studies involving the general public, 
TTO responses are highly skewed towards a value of 1 (full health). However, as noted 
above, we are only really interested here in the qualitative interpretation of the results and 
we have established from various additional analyses that standard regression techniques 
generate very similar results to non-parametric and logistic regression methods in terms 
of the significance or otherwise of the variables used to explain the TTO. 
 
3. Results  
 
Table 1 shows important descriptive statistics from the study. Beyond this table, as would 
be expected from a community-based sample, there are very few people in level three of 
any of the dimensions, and only 5% are in an EQ-5D state that contains at least one level 
three. However, there are significant numbers of people in level two and, as a result, only 
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36% of the sample is in state 11111. A greater proportion of respondents (39%) have 
moderate pain/discomfort or moderate anxiety/depression, or both. Applying the UK 
general population TTO-based valuation ‘tariff’ for the EQ-5D reported in Dolan (1997) 
to the distribution of EQ-5D states results in a mean value of 0.816. This compares to a 
mean of 0.885 from the TTO responses in this study (the higher values are consistent 
with the evidence (e.g. de Wit et al, 2002) to suggest that those in poor health states do 
not consider them to be as bad as those imagining those states).  
 
Table 2 shows the frequency of the thoughts about four important domains of life. It can 
be seen that the domains are generally thought about a few times or many times by the 
majority of respondents: health was not thought about at all yesterday by about one-
quarter of the respondents but only continually by 4% of the sample. Table 3 shows the 
categories of respondents according to the frequency of their thoughts about health and 
whether the highest rated feeling associated with those thoughts is non-negative (happy is 
rated at least as highly as the other feelings) or negative (angry, depressed or worried). It 
can be seen that 44% of respondents have positive thoughts and 30% have negative 
thoughts, with 12% of the sample having negative thoughts many times or continually.  
 
The main regression models are shown in Table 3. The analysis begins by considering the 
degree to which the EQ-5D dimensions and levels explain the TTO responses (Model I). 
The only dummy variables that are significant are when usual activities is at level 2, when 
anxiety/depression is at level 3 and when any dimension is at level 3. We next add in 
dummy variables for the variant of the TTO and the version of the survey (Model II). 
Consistent with a great deal of evidence to support anchoring effects, TTO responses are 
significantly higher in the top down variant than in the bottom up one: a mean of 0.92 
compared to 0.85. More striking is the difference between the proportions of 
respondents unwilling to trade off any time at all: 52% in the top down variant as 
compared to 11% in the bottom up variant. The importance of TTO variant would be a 
concern if our focus was on generating a TTO-based tariff of values but we are 
interested in explaining TTO responses and it turns out that what explains them is 
unaffected by whether the TTO is top down or bottom up.  
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Of more importance to the potential impact of the thoughts about health on TTO 
responses, there are no differences in the TTO responses – or in the degree to which 
they are explained by the EQ-5D dimensions – according to whether the TTO come 
before or after the well-being and thoughts and feelings questions. Whilst we could 
expect TTO responses to be contaminated by having previously been asked to report on 
thoughts about health, it is less likely that thoughts about health will be contaminated by 
having previously been asked a TTO question. The robustness of any impact of thoughts 
about health or other domains of life, on TTO responses is therefore enhanced by the 
fact that TTO responses are unaffected by the version of the questionnaire. 
 
Interestingly, there are no significant differences in any of these variables according to 
whether the questionnaire was completed via the internet or over the phone. When we 
additionally add in the standard set of background variables, we find that age and age 
squared are both significant (Model III), which is supportive of previous evidence that 
shows TTO values are highest in middle age (Dolan et al, 1996). We did not include sex, 
employment status, marital status and income as they are all insignificant. None of these 
results are particularly striking or novel but do go some way towards validating the 
responses to the internet and telephone survey against what has previously been found in 
the literature from face-to-face interviews. 
 
We next introduce the responses to the questions about affect yesterday and they are not 
significant in explaining TTO responses (we report on the results for average positive 
and negative affect but the results hold for other ways of categorising the ratings). Note, 
however, that affect and thoughts are related to one another in the expected way i.e. 
worse affect yesterday is associated with frequent and negative thoughts. Next we add in 
the thoughts about each domain, where only thoughts about health are important in 
explaining TTO responses. Specifically, those who have frequent and negative thoughts 
about health have lower TTO values. When health is thought about ‘many times’ or 
‘continually’ and when those thoughts are predominantly negative, respondents are 
willing to sacrifice significantly more life years to alleviate their current health problems. 
The size of the effect is comparable to the size of the effect of the order in which the 
TTO responses are presented: about 7.5% of the standard 0-1 scale. Note that this effect 
holds after controlling for their actual EQ-5D health state and also holds for the version 
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in which the TTO question immediately follows the EQ-5D and where respondents 
would arguably be primed to think about their health only in terms of the EQ-5D.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
In the valuation of states of health and illness, health economists have followed the 
standard approach in economics of using preference-based methods to determine 
(decision) utility. TTO values from the general public for health states defined in terms 
of the EQ-5D health state classification system are now being used by NICE in the UK 
to help determine the cost-effectiveness of health technologies. We have argued 
elsewhere that economists should devote more attention to measures of experienced 
utility and move away from a reliance on measures of decision utility in the valuation of 
non-market goods such as health (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008).  
 
Much of the evidence (e.g. Smith et al, 2006) to show that people are willing to make 
large sacrifices in life expectancy to alleviate conditions for which there is a considerable 
degree of hedonic adaptation can be explained by a focussing illusion (Schkade and 
Kahneman, 1998; Gilbert and Wilson, 2003). Every preference elicitation question, by its 
very nature, focuses our attention on something, and so we will generally be led to 
overstate the relative importance to our lives of the things that we are asked to focus on 
(e.g. dimensions of the EQ-5D in health state valuation). Moreover, the classification 
systems focus attention disproportionately on the negative aspects of health (Jansen et al, 
2000) and it is hard to get respondents to shift their focus from such negative things 
(Ubel et al, 2001). 
 
There is, however, at least one other way in which poor health might show up in our 
experiences in addition to its impact on measures of, or proxies for, activity-focussed 
experienced utility; namely, in relation to our “mind-wanderings” and thoughts about 
health. In this exploratory study, we have considered the ways in which feelings over the 
course of a day (as a reliable proxy for DRM data) and intrusive thoughts about health 
might explain TTO preferences in addition to the effect of the health state itself. 
Consistent with the discrepancy between assessments of affect and expression of 
preference, feelings yesterday are not significant in explaining TTO responses. However, 
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those who think about their health frequently and negatively when they do so (which is 
in fact related to affect yesterday) are more willing to sacrifice life years in order to 
alleviate their health problems. This result also holds for those that are asked for their 
TTO response after and before being asked about their thoughts about health.  
 
There are good grounds for supposing that these results are generated partly by a 
focussing effect. When asked to think about sacrificing life years in order to remove their 
health problems, it is likely that respondents focus on thinking about their health 
problems much more than they would routinely do so in the experience of their lives: 
nothing in life (including thoughts about health) is quite as important as you think it is 
while you are thinking about it. As possible evidence of a focussing effect in this study is 
the fact that thoughts about work, family and finances are not associated with TTO 
responses. Respondents were not explicitly asked to think about how intrusive thoughts 
impact upon their lives, yet in being asked about their current health problems they seem 
to have had their attention drawn specifically to thoughts about health. As a simple 
manipulation of the TTO question, respondents in a future study could be asked for their 
willingness to give up life years to improve their health and reduce any concerns they 
might have. Under these circumstances, frequent and negative thoughts about finances, 
for example, might then be significantly related to TTO responses. Where TTO-type 
preferences are elicited, we should consider what else to draw attention to in addition to 
the dimensions of a health state classification system, not least because, when we die 
prematurely, we lose everything in life and not just the (usually negative) things 
associated with our health states that we are traditionally asked to focus our attention on.  
 
Of course, we cannot draw attention to everything that might be relevant to the 
experience of our lives and we cannot force respondents to pay most attention to those 
things that will actually matter most in their experiences. We have little doubt that the 
approach we adopted in this study has introduced its own focussing effects but insofar as 
TTO preferences say anything meaningful at all about the impact of health states on 
experienced utility, it is encouraging that thoughts about health are significant in 
explaining TTO responses irrespective of whether they are asked about before or after 
the TTO. The qualitative nature of this finding makes intuitive sense: we are concerned 
about the thoughts we have about our health in addition to our state of health, and we 
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are willing to trade-off life years to reduce negative thoughts just as we are willing to 
trade-off life years to improve our health state. The results presented here, particularly if 
they are replicated elsewhere, may go some way towards explaining the important 
discrepancy between preferences and experiences. Whilst preference-based measures will 
continue to be unreliable measures of the true impact of policy on people’s lives, due 
consideration of the things that we regularly think about may help economists reconcile 
some of the differences that exist between measures of decision utility on the one hand 
and measures of experienced utility or feelings over time on the other.  
 
Empirical evidence of the kind presented here does not have any normative implications 
in itself but, if intrusive thoughts are indeed found to be important determinants of both 
preferences and the flow of experiences, they could lead us to consider alternative ways 
of thinking about utility in economics and in health policy. By paying attention to our 
intrusive thoughts alongside more conventional changes in health status, policy-makers 
may give more consideration to interventions that focus on improving the ways in which 
we think and feel about our health. There is now good evidence that negative thoughts, 
such as worry, are associated with adverse health outcomes, such as increased cortisol 
levels and increased heart rate, and that such thoughts may actually cause increased heart 
disease and fatigue, and slower recovery from surgery (for a review, see Watkins, 2008). 
Of course, negative thoughts might also be good for health through their effects on 
health-promoting behaviours, and there is evidence, for example, that increased worry 
about breast cancer is associated with a greater probability of undertaking screening (Hay 
et al, 2006). These issues go way beyond the remit of this paper and the implications of 
our data but some future research efforts could be directed towards determining when to 
reduce negative thoughts, by how much, and for whom.  
 
In relation to our central question of how to value health, let us return to the questions 
that need to be addressed to calculate the “quality adjustment” part of the QALY. 
Consistent with previous arguments (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008), we suggest that ‘what 
is to be valued’ is the impact that health states have on our thoughts and feelings, as we 
experience these over time. In relation to ‘how is to be valued’, whilst the DRM may 
provide us with important information about the feelings associated with different 
activities, it may provide us with an incomplete account of the full flow of utility if 
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intrusive thoughts about health impact upon us in ways that are not picked up by 
activity-focussed or more general assessments of feelings alone.  
 
There may be many ways of tapping into intrusive thoughts besides the approach 
adopted here but, whatever their design, future studies should aim to establish just how 
important thoughts about health etc. are in the flow of experiences. Intrusive thoughts 
may well affect our willingness to trade off life years when we stop to think about them 
but they may also affect our experienced utility directly and so we need to consider better 
ways of determining the duration-weighted impact of such thoughts. One way to address 
this issue in future research would be through an experience sampling or DRM-type 
study that asked respondents about thoughts and feelings before asking about them what 
they are doing and who they are with. It may be that asking people about their main 
activity before asking them about their mood draws their attention away from what they 
were thinking about and such a study would allow us to say something about importance 
of an activity-related (or indeed general mood-related) focussing effect. 
 
The debate about what should be valued and how it should be valued is set to continue 
for some time and we can only focus on some of the important issues here. However, in 
relation to the question of ‘who is to value it’, we strongly urge health economists and 
policy-makers to move away from using the preferences of the general public and 
‘population tariffs’ to value the impact of health states. This is not only for the reasons 
we have referred to here and discussed in detail elsewhere (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008) 
but also because it strikes us as normatively suspect to assume in policy analysis that a 
given health state will have the same effect on all of us. NICE and other agencies should 
also seek to identify those whose thoughts and feelings are most affected by that state 
and look to target interventions accordingly. The social value of the benefits of health 
care will obviously depend on a whole host of factors – some of which may indeed relate 
to the satisfaction of individual and social preferences – but we hope to have provided 
some fresh insight into how we might go about more accurately measuring the direct 
effects that health states have on people’s lives as they experience them.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Average age 50 
Male 46% 
Single 15% 
Married 65% 
Divorced 15% 
Employed  62% 
Retired 20% 
Average household income $54,237 
No problems walking about  81% 
No problems with self-care 97% 
No problems with usual activities 83% 
No pain/discomfort 51% 
No anxiety/depression 67% 
Average time trade-off response 0.885 
Average ‘happiness’ yesterday (0-6) 4.5 
Average ‘sadness’ yesterday (0-6) 1.1 
 
 
Table 2: Frequency of thoughts 
Domain Not at all A few times Many times Continually 
Work 29% 32% 28% 11% 
Family 2% 25% 51% 22% 
Finances 16% 56% 19% 8% 
Health 26% 57% 12% 4% 
  
 
Table 3: Type of thoughts about health  
  
No thoughts about health  26% 
Low frequency and positive thoughts 40% 
High frequency and positive thoughts 4% 
Low frequency and negative thoughts 18% 
High frequency and negative thoughts 12% 
 
If respondents thought about health “a few times” they were placed in the low frequency group 
and if they thought about health “many times” or “continually” they were placed in the high 
frequency group. For each group, we use the ‘U-index method’ to determine positive or negative 
thoughts: namely, if ‘happy’ was the highest or joint-highest rated feeling, the dummy takes a 
value of 0 (and the thoughts are labelled as ‘positive’) and, if the highest rated feeling was ‘angry’, 
‘depressed’ or ‘worried’, it takes a value of 1. 
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Table 4: TTO regressions 
 
Dependent variable: TTO (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
eqm2 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.010 
eqm3 -0.018 -0.002 0.011 -0.008 -0.018 
eqs2 -0.001 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.009 
eqs3 -0.119 -0.166 -0.183 -0.169 -0.157 
equ2 -0.061* -0.063* -0.065* -0.060* -0.047 
equ3 0.182 0.168 0.141 0.151* 0.169 
eqp2 -0.029 -0.029 -0.040* -0.032* -0.029 
eqp3 0.189 0.177 0.164 0.184 0.186* 
eqa2 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.038* 0.043* 
eqa3 0.257* 0.243* 0.258* 0.322* 0.319* 
eqn3 -0.440* -0.422* -0.415* -0.412* -0.393* 
Random TTO  -0.073* -0.074* -0.074* -0.074* 
Age   0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 
Age2   0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
Average ‘happiness’ yesterday    0.015 0.013 
Average ‘sadness’ yesterday    -0.013 -0.007 
Thoughts about health: 
low frequency and positive thoughts     0.040 
Thoughts about health: 
high frequency and positive thoughts     0.035 
Thoughts about health: 
low frequency and negative thoughts     -0.030 
Thoughts about health: 
high frequency and negative thoughts      -0.076* 
Constant 0.920* 1.016* 0.724* 0.688*    0.664* 
R2 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Observations 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173 
* 5% significance level 
 
The reference ‘thoughts about health’ variable is ‘no thoughts at all’. If individuals thought about 
health a few times they were placed in the low frequency group and if they thought about health 
many times or continually they were placed in the high frequency group. For each group, we use 
the ‘U-index method’ for determining positive or negative thoughts: if ‘happy’ was the highest or 
joint-highest rated feeling, the dummy takes a value of 0 (and thoughts are labelled as ‘positive’) 
and if the highest rated feeling was ‘angry’, ‘depressed’ or ‘worried’, it takes a value of 1.  
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